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The nature of unemployment has changed dramatically in the last
two decades.  As global competition and rapidly evolving technologies
have resulted in the dislocation of millions of workers from their
jobs—even as new jobs are being created—layoffs have become per-
manent in nature, rather than simply a temporary experience during
fluctuations in the business cycle.  These “dislocated workers” who
have been permanently laid off from a long-term job face substantial
earnings losses and often have difficulty finding a new job (U.S. De-
partment of Labor 1995, p. 47).  In 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) initiated a biennial series of special dislocated worker surveys.
These surveys have revealed that, on average, over two million individ-
uals are dislocated in the United States each year.1 The new reality is
that a large portion of those who lose their jobs never get them back;
thus, affected workers often have to make a transition to a new job.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) conducted a series of nation-
al demonstration projects over a 10-year period (1986–1996) that ex-
plored innovative alternative ways of using unemployment insurance
(UI)—the first stop for most of these dislocated workers—to assist
these workers in making the transition to new jobs.  Beginning in 1987,
DOL sponsored two UI Self-Employment Demonstration Projects, in
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the states of Washington and Massachusetts, that rigorously tested the
viability and cost-effectiveness of self-employment as a reemployment
option for permanently laid-off, or dislocated, workers.  Both of these
demonstrations were run as field experiments which granted individu-
als monetary self-employment assistance in lieu of unemployment in-
surance and provided participants with entrepreneurial training, busi-
ness planning, counseling advice, and technical assistance.  The final
evaluation found that self-employment assistance (SEA)—using the
Massachusetts demonstration program model, which is the basis for
current federal law—is highly cost-effective to program participants,
the federal government, and society as a whole (U.S. Department of
Labor 1995).  The report recommended that the SEA program be made
a permanent option for the unemployed.
The establishment of the SEA program was one of the infrequent
instances when rigorous policy research led to legislative action.  At the
time when the UI SEA experiments were undertaken, the field of mi-
croenterprise development was just forming, and there was a great deal
of skepticism about the utility of self-employment assistance as an em-
ployment strategy.  The positive results from experimental self-em-
ployment demonstration projects conducted by DOL, in collaboration
with state employment security agencies, was instrumental in spurring
Congress to pass federal legislation in 1993 that authorized self-em-
ployment assistance as an alternative use of unemployment insurance.
This 1993 SEA legislation authorized the states to provide unem-
ployed individuals periodic self-employment payments instead of regu-
lar unemployment insurance payments.  The legislation allows states to
use unemployment insurance funds to provide income support to those
unemployed individuals who want work full time on starting their own
businesses.  The program was initially authorized for five years and
was made permanent by Public Law 105-306 in October 1998.
The early identification tool commonly known as “profiling”
played a key role in one of the two self-employment demonstrations,
the Massachusetts project, which became the model for the SEA na-
tional legislation.  Profiling is based on a set of criteria—a “profile”—
that can be used to identify and select those UI claimants who are like-
ly to be dislocated workers out of the broad population of UI claimants.
By providing a mechanism for targeting the SEA provided by the
demonstration on claimants who are dislocated workers, profiling en-
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abled the project to be both cost-effective to the government and politi-
cally viable to several key constituency groups, particularly employers.
Thus, profiling made a large contribution to the establishment of the
SEA program.
This section has provided a brief introduction to the topic of profil-
ing in SEA programs.  The next section reviews the background and
policy context for the SEA program in the United States and the role
that profiling mechanisms were designed to play in this program.  The
third section summarizes key findings from an evaluation report on the
SEA program mandated by Congress as part of the 1993 legislation.
The use of profiling in state SEA programs and its implications is the
focus of the fourth section, which includes descriptive information
from conversations with states that have implemented SEA programs, a
review of operational issues arising from the use of profiling in those
programs and how states have responded to these issues, and a discus-
sion of how profiling-type techniques might be applied to other aspects
of the program.  The final section of the chapter draws some conclu-
sions from the analyses presented in the preceding sections and also
discusses their implications for the future directions for the now-per-
manent SEA program and the role(s) that profiling can continue to play
in the program.
BACKGROUND AND POLICY CONTEXT
FOR THE SEA PROGRAM
Self-Employment as a Reemployment Option
One alternative for promoting the reemployment of UI recipients
who are dislocated workers is self-employment.  The growing recogni-
tion of the contribution of very small businesses to the creation of em-
ployment opportunities, as well as the relatively modest financial and
managerial requirements of self-employment for participation by work-
ers, have generated interest in using self-employment as a tool for as-
sisting unemployed workers in returning to work.  Unlike other ser-
vices to assist the unemployed in obtaining jobs, SEA is designed to
promote direct job creation for unemployed workers—to empower the
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unemployed to create their own jobs by starting small business ven-
tures.  These very small start-up firms, which are called “microenter-
prises,” are typically sole proprietorships with one or, at most, a few
employees, including the owner/operator of the business.
During the 1990s, increasing numbers of dislocated workers in the
United States have been coming from professional, technical, and man-
agerial occupations—occupations which provide skills and experience
that may make these workers particularly well-suited for entering self-
employment.2 While the primary goal of SEA/microenterprise pro-
grams is direct job creation for unemployed workers (or other specific
target groups), the microenterprises started by these individuals may
also generate additional jobs that could be filled by other workers.  Thus,
the SEA program provides an opportunity to integrate labor market pol-
icy and economic development policy in a dynamic relationship, help-
ing participants to enter employment while simultaneously providing a
modest boost to job creation and economic growth in their communities.
Self-employment assistance programs for unemployed workers
were first implemented in several western European nations during the
early 1980s.  These programs were designed to help unemployed work-
ers to “create their own jobs” by starting small businesses, which usual-
ly meant microenterprises.  The two best known self-employment pro-
grams at the time were those in Great Britain and France.  The French
self-employment program, Chômeurs Créateurs, provided eligible indi-
viduals with a single, lump-sum payment for business start-up capital;
the British program, the “Enterprise Allowance Scheme,” provided eli-
gible individuals with biweekly payments to supplement their earnings
during the first year of business operations.  In designing the UI Self-
Employment Demonstration in 1988, DOL and state representatives vis-
ited France, Great Britain, and Sweden to observe firsthand the SEApro-
grams in those countries.  The British and French programs provided
models of how unemployed workers could become self-employed;
these models appeared to be transferable to the United States and were
subsequently adapted for testing in two demonstration projects.
The Self-Employment Demonstration Projects
Ultimately, DOL conducted two experimental demonstration proj-
ects, in the states of Washington and Massachusetts, that tested the via-
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bility and cost-effectiveness of self-employment as an alternative reem-
ployment option for unemployed workers.  These projects were de-
signed to assist UI recipients interested in self-employment to “create
their own jobs” by starting a business venture.  The Washington
demonstration project was initiated by DOL in early 1987, and all costs
were funded by DOL research resources.  The Massachusetts demon-
stration project was authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987.
These demonstration projects provided a basic model of a self-em-
ployment assistance program for unemployed workers.  The program
model includes two key components: financial assistance and business
development services, modeled loosely on the British and French self-
employment programs.  The Massachusetts project was based on the
United Kingdom’s Enterprise Allowance Scheme and paid out biweek-
ly cash self-employment allowances that provided microentrepreneurs
with a source of income while they started their business.  The Wash-
ington State demonstration generally followed the French Chômeurs
Créateurs model and gave a lump-sum payment to unemployed work-
ers interested in developing a microenterprise.  In both programs, the fi-
nancial assistance provided to participants equaled the total amount of
unemployment insurance benefits to which workers would be normally
entitled.  In addition, both projects delivered business development ser-
vices including entrepreneurial training, one-on-one business counsel-
ing, technical assistance, and peer support groups.
The results from the final evaluation of these demonstration proj-
ects clearly indicated that self-employment is a viable reemployment
option for some unemployed workers.  The evaluation found that while
only about 2–3 percent of UI benefit recipients are interested in SEA,
over half of this subset actually start a business.  A final report on the UI
Self-Employment Demonstration projects in Massachusetts and Wash-
ington was completed and published by DOL (Benus et al. 1995).  The
report includes a benefit–cost analysis from three different perspec-
tives: project participants, the government, and society as a whole.  The
key findings from the evaluation of the UI Self-Employment Demon-
stration are as follows.
• SEA significantly increased the probability that unemployed
workers would start a microenterprise.  Compared with the con-
118 Messenger, Peterson-Vaccaro, and Vroman
trol group, Massachusetts participants were 11 percent more
likely to start a business; Washington participants were 22 per-
cent more likely to start a microenterprise than their control
counterparts.
• 61 percent of Washington participants and 74 percent of Massa-
chusetts participants that had started a business sometime during
the demonstration were still in business nearly three years later.
These rates were similar to control group participants that had
started businesses.
• Over the three-year follow-up survey period, SEA participants
were employed longer than those in the control group by 1.9
months in Massachusetts and by 1.1 months in Washington.
• When both self-employment and wage and salary earnings are
considered, the Massachusetts project dramatically increased the
total annual earnings of participants: on average, project partici-
pants earned $5,940 more than those in the control group.
This evaluation also makes a determination as to the cost-effective-
ness of the SEA program models tested from the perspectives of project
participants, the government, and society as a whole.  The benefit–cost
analysis conducted as part of the final report showed that while both
program models proved cost-effective interventions for participants
and society as a whole, only the Massachusetts model proved to be
cost-effective to the government.  As a result, the evaluators concluded
that for the Massachusetts model,
These results indicate that SEA is a cost-effective approach to
promote the rapid reemployment of unemployed workers and
should be permanently incorporated into the U.S. employment se-
curity and economic development system (Benus et al. 1995, pp.
x–xi).
National SEA Legislation and Key Features of the SEA Program
Based on the preliminary impact results from the UI Self-Employ-
ment Demonstration available in mid 1993, a provision allowing states
to establish SEA programs as part of their UI programs was enacted
into federal law as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Implementation Act (Public Law 103-182).3 This provision
allows states the option to offer SEA as an additional tool to help speed
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the transition of dislocated workers into new employment.  States need
to enact legislation that conforms to the federal legislation to establish
SEA programs (Orr et al. 1994).
State SEA programs provide participants with periodic (weekly or
biweekly) self-employment allowances while they are getting their
businesses off the ground.  These income support payments will be the
same weekly amount as the worker’s regular UI benefits, but partici-
pants can work full time on starting their businesses instead of search-
ing for wage and salary jobs, and they can also retain any earnings from
self-employment.  In effect, this provision removes a barrier in the
law—one that forced unemployed workers interested in self-employ-
ment to choose between receiving UI benefits and starting a business.
Under this legislation, in states that operate SEA programs, only
those UI recipients identified through profiling as likely to exhaust their
UI benefits are eligible for SEA.  Self-employment program partici-
pants are also required to work full time on starting a business, as well
as participate in SEA services—such as entrepreneurial training, busi-
ness counseling, and other activities—to ensure that they have the
skills necessary to operate a business.
DOL issued federal guidelines regarding self-employment pro-
grams in an Unemployment Insurance Program Letter in early 1994.
States have the flexibility to establish their own programs within these
guidelines.  To do so, states first need to enact conforming state legisla-
tion to establish their self-employment programs, develop a state plan
describing how their SEA program will operate, and then submit the
state plan to DOL for review and approval.
The 1993 legislation allowed the SEA program to run for five
years, and the initial five-year authorization period for the SEA pro-
gram was due to expire in December 1998.  Ultimately, the program
was made permanent by Public Law 105-306 (The Noncitizen Benefit
Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998), which
was signed into law on October 28, 1998.
The Role of Profiling in the Demonstration Projects 
and in the SEA Program
Self-employment and microenterprise development programs have
proliferated since the time that DOL began its demonstration projects
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testing self-employment as a reemployment option for the unemployed.
Most of these microenterprise programs, however, focus their efforts
on self-employment for welfare recipients and other disadvantaged in-
dividuals; that is, on using self-employment as an antipoverty strategy.
The SEA program has been and still is one of the few self-employment
programs targeted specifically to unemployed workers who have sig-
nificant labor market experience yet are unlikely to return to jobs simi-
lar to those they had prior to layoff.  Furthermore, SEA is the only such
program that provides such individuals with a period of guaranteed in-
come support while they are starting and operating their own business-
es.  Profiling, the mechanism used to identify dislocated workers eligi-
ble for the SEA program out of the broad UI claimant population,
helped the SEA program to be both cost-effective to the government
and politically viable for several key constituency groups, particularly
employers.  Profiling helps ease the concern of employers who want
their former employees to be available for recall and are not being sub-
sidized to establish microenterprises that might compete with them
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
The use of profiling to identify eligible individuals for the SEA pro-
gram is designed to target the program on the subset of UI claimants
who have been permanently laid off from their previous jobs and who
are most likely to experience extended spells of unemployment and
thus likely to exhaust their UI benefits.  Profiling uses a set of criteria,
called a “profile,” to identify those UI claimants who are likely to be
dislocated workers out of the broad population of all UI claimants.
Typically, profiling models include both individual characteristics (e.g.,
an individual’s level of educational attainment) and economic variables
(e.g., whether or not employment in a particular occupation is growing
or declining).  The rationale for this targeting is that claimants identi-
fied as likely to exhaust UI through profiling are those most in need of
reemployment services to be able to return to work; thus, the self-em-
ployment assistance provided by the SEA program is merely one alter-
native in an array of tools designed to assist dislocated workers in their
efforts to become reemployed.
As in the WPRS initiative, profiling in the SEA program targets
dislocated workers for self-employment assistance because they are
considered to be most in need of services.  In addition, however, target-
ing on dislocated workers may be particularly appropriate for the SEA
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program because an increasing proportion of all dislocated workers are
now coming from professional, technical, and managerial occupa-
tions—occupations that require knowledge and skills that may be par-
ticularly applicable for self-employment.  The experiences of the UI
Self-Employment Demonstration provide evidence supporting this ap-
proach.  In Washington State, 37 percent of all participants came from
professional, technical, and managerial occupations, and in Massachu-
setts, more than half of all participants (57 percent) came from these
occupations.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF STATE SEA PROGRAMS
Descriptive Information on State SEA Programs
There are currently SEA programs in eight states: listed in chrono-
logical order of program implementation, they are New York, Oregon,
Maine, Delaware, New Jersey, California, Maryland, and Pennsylva-
nia.  These programs are broadly similar but with several identifiable
differences.  Table 5.1 provides information on detailed aspects of the
programs.
Six of the eight states operate statewide programs, meaning UI
claimants at any local office may participate if eligible.  Entrepreneur-
ial training and other support services are not necessarily available lo-
cally, but participants control the decision regarding whether or not to
travel to the sites where services are offered.  California and Pennsyl-
vania are exceptions regarding geographic coverage.
All programs are required to use profiling to select eligible SEA
participants.  The individual profiling threshold probabilities (i.e., the
minimum likelihood of benefit exhaustion for SEA program eligibility)
range from no minimum threshold probability in the eight Pennsylva-
nia service-delivery areas (SDAs) that offer SEA to a high of 70 percent
in New York.4
States follow differing practices in contacting potential SEA partic-
ipants.  As indicated in Table 5.1, five states send letters informing
claimants of the SEA program and inviting them to attend an initial in-
formational meeting.  The other three provide information during an
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initial face-to-face meeting (benefits rights interview or profiling ses-
sion).  While the latter approach may take more time per client, it seems
more efficient in making early identifications of those with definite in-
terests in self-employment.  Oregon, in fact, changed its procedures so
that screening now occurs at the profiling session and avoids situations
where individuals go to small business development centers (SBDCs)
with little background and/or little serious interest in self-employment.
In five of eight states, the initial informational meeting where SEA
is fully described occurs in offices of the employment service or in one-
stop centers.  Exceptions are California, where the informational meet-
ing occurs in local SDA offices, and Maryland and Pennsylvania,
where the offices of the service provider are used.5
All SEA programs provide a similar set of basic services to support
those interested in pursuing self-employment.  Entrepreneurial train-
ing, counseling, and technical support are offered universally.  Initial
assessment often occurs at an SBDC.  Specialized services may be rec-
ommended, and counseling may also be available.  The SBDCs further
provide assistance in developing and reviewing business plans pre-
pared by participants.  Three states also indicated that peer support ses-
sions are provided to participants (at least in some local geographic ar-
eas).  However, given the low levels of SEA enrollment (to be
discussed presently), the number of such meetings and total participa-
tion is extremely limited.
Financial support other than weekly SEA allowances may be need-
ed to start up new enterprises.  Potential sources available to individu-
als include personal savings, other family sources, or loans from finan-
cial institutions.  Often SBDCs advise on loan availability and loan
application procedures, but loans are currently being made by SBDCs
or other SEA service providers.  State SEA reports for 1996 typically
showed that a very small number of loans had been received.6
Table 5.1 also identifies how each state pays for support services
provided to clients.  Most commonly, client services were financed
with Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Title III monies, a source
used in six states.  This financing included JTPA discretionary monies
controlled by the governors in three states.  New Jersey finances most
training activities with monies from its Workforce Development Part-
nership, a state payroll tax–financed reemployment program.  Pennsyl-
vania uses monies from its general revenue-supported Projects for
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Community Building, a state economic and community development
program with eight separate components.
Support services are also commonly provided by SBDCs.  In
Maine, SBDC support is provided through a contract with the Maine
Department of Labor.  The Labor Department monies are derived from
the penalty and interest account (or special administrative expense
fund) of the unemployment insurance agency.  Table 5.1 identifies this
source of financing in Maine.  SBDC activities in four other states are
supported by their SBDC’s own resources.
Less common funding sources include in-kind services.  Services
provided by the Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE) in three
states have included help in preparing contracts, counseling program
participants, and assistance in preparing business plans.  In New York,
the Internal Revenue Service also conducts seminars informing partici-
pants on tax obligations of small businesses.
Thus, for six of eight SEA programs, financial support for SEA ser-
vices to clients is derived from more than a single source.  Monies are
most often derived from JTPA (now WIA) and SBDC.  The two excep-
tions are New Jersey and Maine, where financing is predominantly pro-
vided by the Workforce Development Partnership program and the UI
penalty and interest account, respectively.
The final feature of the SEA programs covered by Table 5.1 is their
size in terms of their anticipated and actual numbers of enrollments.
The NAFTA Implementation Act specified that enrollment in SEA
could not exceed 5 percent of those receiving regular UI benefits.  Each
program in its planning stages was to indicate the anticipated number
of clients.  These numbers are shown at the bottom of the table, along
with actual 1996 and 1997 enrollments (1998 enrollments in Pennsyl-
vania).  With the exceptions of New York and New Jersey, the SEA
states have had many fewer enrollees than originally anticipated.  Thus,
it is clear that SEA is a small program, both relative to the regular UI
program and in the absolute numbers of participants.
Personal and Economic Characteristics 
of SEA Program Participants
Table 5.2 shows the 1996 and 1997 personal and economic charac-
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programs.  For comparative purposes, the table also shows information
on the characteristics of the insured unemployed (regular UI claimants)
in these states in 1996.7 SEA participants differ from regular UI
claimants in several respects.  Table 5.2 provides comparative informa-
tion on age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, education, and UI weekly
benefits for the two groups.
SEA participants in every state are, on average, older than the in-
sured unemployed.  The differences in average age range from a low of
1.8 years in Maine in 1996 to a high of 7–8 years in New York and Ore-
gon.  These systematic age differences mirror the age differences typi-
cally observed between the self-employed and wage and salary work-
ers.8 The likelihood of self-employment increases among workers as
they attain older ages.  SEA participants share this characteristic with
the wider self-employed population.
Among the five states there are no dramatic patterns of gender dif-
ferences between SEA participants and the insured unemployed.  The
1996 percentages of women in the two groups were nearly identical in
New York.  SEA participants had a noticeably higher representation of
women in Maine and Oregon but had a lower representation in
Delaware.
Ethnic differences between SEA participants and the insured unem-
ployed also are apparent in Table 5.2.  In both New Jersey and
Delaware, the percentages of blacks in SEA are lower than among the
insured unemployed.  New York, the other state with a sizeable black
population, had somewhat higher participation in SEA than among reg-
ular UI claimants.  For Hispanics, on the other hand, SEA participation
has been consistently low.
The occupational distributions in Table 5.2 reveal a consistent pat-
tern for four of the five states.  In New York, Oregon, Maine, and
Delaware, a very high percentage of SEA participants were from the
professional, technical, and managerial occupations, while low per-
centages were drawn from industrial occupations.  In New York, for ex-
ample, 46.9 percent of SEA participants in 1996 were professional,
technical, and managerial, compared to just 17.8 percent among the in-
sured unemployed.  The industrial occupations in New York supplied
just 14.0 percent of SEA participants in 1996 but 49.5 percent of the in-
sured unemployed.
New Jersey appears to be an outlier in its SEA occupational distri-
bution.  Compared with the insured unemployed, SEA participants
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were less likely to be professional, technical, and managerial, but more
likely to be from industrial occupations.  Conversations with New Jer-
sey officials did not identify an explanation for this situation.  Note that
this pattern was observed in both 1996 and 1997.
In all five states, SEA participants showed a relatively high level of
educational attainment.  For the eight education distributions appearing
in Table 5.2, the percentage whose schooling exceeded 12 years (high
school) exceeded 50 percent in seven (Maine in 1997 was the excep-
tion).  In four instances, the percentage exceeded 60 percent.  While the
regular UI programs’ reporting systems do not record educational at-
tainment for the insured unemployed, their average attainment is un-
doubtedly lower than for SEA participants.
Data from New York’s 1996 SEA report are instructive regarding
the link between educational attainment and SEA participation and
SEA completion (Vroman 1998, Appendix B). The average participa-
tion rate among those profiled and identified as likely UI exhaustees
was 0.93 percent (2,195 participants out of 235,126).  By education
level, however, the participation rates were 0.28 percent for those with
less than high school education, 0.64 percent for those with high school
education, and 1.59 percent for those with more than a high school
diploma.
SEA completion rates in New York were also linked to educational
attainment.  The overall completion rate was 0.80 (i.e., 1,751 of 2,195)
as shown in Table 5.2.  Completion rates by education levels were 0.66
for those with less than high school, 0.76 for those with a high school
education, and 0.82 for those with more than high school. From the
New York data, it is clear that the probability of entering and the prob-
ability of completing SEA both increase with the level of educational
attainment.
For all five states in Table 5.2, it can be inferred that SEA partici-
pants had much higher pre-unemployment wages than the wages of the
insured unemployed.  Weekly benefits in UI programs are based on
high quarterly earnings or average weekly wages during the base peri-
od.9 The weekly benefit amount (WBA) of SEA participants in 1996
ranged from 4.9 to 26.5 percent higher than the average WBA for the
insured unemployed, and four percentage differentials exceeded 20
percent.  The smaller proportional differential in Maine could reflect
the high percentage of women (and associated lower earnings) among
Profiling in Self-Employment Assistance Programs 131
its SEA participants.  While the SEA reports do not indicate the pre-un-
employment levels of earnings among participants, their percentage
differentials vis-à-vis the insured unemployed undoubtedly exceed the
percentage differentials in weekly benefits shown in Table 5.2.10 Thus,
for four of the five states, SEA enrolled relatively high-wage workers,
i.e., workers with much higher wages than the wages of the insured un-
employed.
To summarize, there were clear differences in 1996 and 1997 be-
tween the characteristics of SEA participants and the insured unem-
ployed.  On average, SEA participants were older, substantially less
likely to be Hispanic, and more likely to be drawn from the profession-
al, technical, and managerial occupations and from the higher ranks of
the educational attainment distribution.11 SEA participants also earned
considerably more on average than the insured unemployed prior to the
onset of unemployment.
Clearly, SEA participants are not a random group drawn from the
pool of eligibles identified as likely exhaustees through state profiling
models; rather, SEA participants are a self-selected subgroup of likely
UI exhaustees.  Participation rates are systematically higher for whites,
those with higher educational attainment, and those from the profes-
sional, technical, and managerial occupations.
Early SEA Program Outcomes and Costs
SEA programs are required to report on the economic outcomes of
program participants for each year that SEA operated for more than six
months.  This requirement applied to four SEA states in 1996 (New
York, Oregon, Maine, and Delaware) and to one state in 1997 (New
Jersey).  Due to the small scale of Delaware’s program, it will not be
included in the present discussion.
Data on economic outcomes for program participants were ob-
tained from questionnaires, sent by mail.  Interview data are particular-
ly important for the self-employed because such persons are not cov-
ered by the UI system and self-employment earnings are not subject to
UI reporting.  However, self-employment income is frequently episod-
ic, especially at the early stages of new business ventures.  Data on self-
employment earnings are subject to the twin problems of faulty recall
and misreporting (underreporting).  Survey-based estimates of self-em-
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ployment earnings provide systematically downward-biased estimates
of actual earnings.
Table 5.3 displays selected data on economic outcomes for partici-
pants in four states in 1996 and 1997.  The table shows estimates of la-
bor force status, self-employment business activity, and post-SEA wage
and salary earnings of participants.  Wages and salaries are also shown
for the fourth quarter of 1996 and 1997.12 In New York, the data dis-
tinguish SEA program completers from dropouts.
The respondents to follow-up interviews in New York represented
just less than half of all SEA program participants.  Lacking informa-
tion from other sources, however, the analysis will use these data.  Note
also the generally small sample sizes, especially in Oregon.
The data in Table 5.3 are seriously incomplete.  Even if these 
data were complete and based on much larger samples, there is still the
issue of the short elapsed interval between program completion and the
time when these state surveys were undertaken.  From the demonstra-
tion project results, it would be expected that important adjustments
would still be occurring two or three years following SEA participa-
tion.
The data from New York and Maine both recorded the employment
situation of SEA participants using three employment categories: self-
employed only, wage and salary employment only, and both types of
employment at the same time.  New York further noted those unem-
ployed and retired.  At the time of the interviews, the vast majority of
SEA participants were employed, with employment proportions of 89
percent and 86 percent for participants in Maine and 89 percent for
SEA completers in New York.  Of the New York dropouts, 66 percent
were employed.  The latter group also had high unemployment, 28 per-
cent of all dropouts.  Among New York SEA completers not employed,
about half were retired and the proportion unemployed was only 2 per-
cent.
In both Maine and New York, about three-quarters of those em-
ployed were working exclusively as self-employed or working both as
self-employed and as wage and salary workers.  Only the New York
dropouts were working mainly as wage and salary workers.  At the time
of the interviews, about half of the dropouts were working exclusively
as wage and salary workers, while less than one-tenth were exclusively
self-employed.
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Among all states, a consistently high proportion of SEA partici-
pants started businesses.  The proportions in Table 5.3 range from 65 to
77 percent in New Jersey, Oregon, Maine, and New York (among SEA
program completers).  For New York dropouts, the business start-up
proportion was only 21 percent.
Business start-ups were heavily concentrated in two broad industry
groupings, services and trade (wholesale plus retail).  For the three
states that reported the industry of the start-up businesses, the percent-
ages in these two industries combined were as follows: New York, 83.4
percent; New Jersey, 66.7 percent; and Oregon, 72.0 percent.  In New
York, where information was also given on previous industry of SEA
participants, there were large employment increases in services (in-
creasing from 33.0 percent to 68.3 percent) and decreases in employ-
ment in finance, manufacturing, transportation and utilities, and “indus-
try not available.”  The combined percentage for these latter four
industries decreased from 47.1 percent to 12.9 percent.  Clearly, many
of the business start-ups involved large changes in the types of work ac-
tivities now being undertaken by SEA participants compared with their
previous jobs (Vroman 1998).
The gross income data from three states indicate that annual busi-
ness sales were low in all three: $26,429 in New Jersey, $37,049 in
Oregon, and less than $10,000 in Maine.  Note that net business income
was less than $7,000 in both New Jersey and Oregon.  Thus, for these
three states there is a consistent picture of relatively low levels of busi-
ness sales and net business income.  This is similar to findings from the
self-employment demonstration projects.
Each state reported on the number of jobs added by the new busi-
nesses, besides those for the entrepreneurs.  Table 5.3 indicates that
there were significant indirect employment effects in all four states.
The average number of added (or indirect) jobs ranged from 0.8 per
business start-up in Maine and New Jersey to more than 1.4 per busi-
ness start-up in New York.  These added employment effects were larg-
er than those reported in the Washington State demonstration.
In addition to the self-employment outcomes, substantial numbers
of participants worked as wage and salary workers following enroll-
ment in SEA.  The proportions in the interview data at the top of Table
5.3 were 30 percent in 1996 and 54 percent in 1997 in Maine, 30 per-
cent for New York completers (255 of 853), and 58 percent for New
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York dropouts (100 of 173).  A second perspective on this phenomenon
is provided by the data in the bottom rows of the table.  These show
counts of those who worked as wage and salary workers during the
fourth quarter of 1996 and 1997 based on administrative data.  Five of
the six proportions range from 18 percent to 55 percent, with only New
Jersey’s proportion being lower.  Thus, both survey data and adminis-
trative data show sizeable proportions working in wage and salary em-
ployment.
For all four states, the amounts of wages and salaries earned by
SEA participants during the fourth quarter were reported.  These
amounts and the per-person averages appear in the bottom panel of
Table 5.3.  Five of the six averages range from $3,130 in Maine to
$6,525 for New York dropouts.13 Since wage levels differ widely
among states, it seemed more appropriate to compare these averages
with average wages in the same states.  Estimates of average quarterly
wages in UI-covered employment are shown for each state.  Finally, the
bottom line shows the ratio of the SEA average to the all-worker aver-
age.  These ratios range from 0.53 in Oregon (1996) to 0.69 in New
York.
For SEA participants with wages and salaries in the fourth quarter
of 1996 and 1997, the averages represent substantial amounts of earn-
ings.  Recall from Table 5.2, however, that SEA participants in all four
states earned more than the average for all UI claimants prior to the on-
set of unemployment (as indicated by above-average weekly UI bene-
fits).  Thus, the quarterly averages in Table 5.3 represent much lower
average earnings for participants than they earned before unemploy-
ment.  This finding is consistent with previous work on dislocated
workers, such as findings based on the CPS dislocated worker surveys.
The data examined in Table 5.3 suggest the following four conclu-
sions:
1) the vast majority of SEA participants were employed at the
time of their interviews;
2) in New York, where SEA completers and dropouts could be
compared, the dropouts had lower rates of employment, higher
rates of unemployment, higher rates of wage and salary em-
ployment, and lower rates of self-employment;
3) in all four states, SEA program participation was followed by a
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high rate of business start-ups.  The start-up proportions were
65 percent or higher; and
4) in each state, a sizeable proportion of SEA participants (rang-
ing from 18 to 50 percent) had wage and salary earnings during
the fourth quarter of 1996.  
The average wage and salary earnings for these persons generally
ranged from 0.51 to 0.69 of statewide average wages for the quarter.
Some caveats in the SEA outcomes data also should be empha-
sized.  First, most data on labor market outcomes came from surveys
with low response rates.  The nonrespondents may have had inferior
outcomes vis-à-vis the outcomes reported by the respondents.  Second,
a longer time interval following SEA participation would be more ap-
propriate for measuring labor market outcomes.  Measurement over a
longer time period would probably reveal larger numbers of business
start-ups, business failures, and moves to wage and salary employment.
Finally, unlike the self-employment demonstrations, there is no control
group against which the labor market outcomes for participants can be
compared.14 Thus, no easy way exists to assess the impacts of SEA.
Instead, the outcomes that are summarized in Table 5.4 should be char-
acterized as gross outcomes, not as net impacts.
The 1996 and 1997 SEA program annual reports from the states
provided information on the costs of SEA.  No quantitative estimates of
costs were supplied by California, New York, and Delaware.  Limited
data were supplied by Oregon and Maine.  Only New Jersey provided a
reasonably complete accounting of costs.  Reporting instructions di-
rected the states to provide information on two main kinds of costs: the
added costs of UI program administration and the costs of providing
entrepreneurial training and other services to SEA participants.  The
states were instructed not to report on allowances paid to SEA partici-
pants.
A summation that includes the variable costs of SEA training and
other support services plus UI administrative costs can be done only in
New Jersey.  The average cost per enrollee was $1,127 in 1997.  Given
the limitations of the cost data supplied by the states, we hesitate to
make strong conclusions about program costs.
From the data supplied in the 1996 and 1997 annual SEA reports,
two tentative conclusions may be drawn.  First, New Jersey’s average
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variable costs of $1,127 in 1997 did not differ widely from the costs of
self-employment demonstrations, where inflated estimates from Mas-
sachusetts and Washington were $1,213 and $474, respectively.15 Sec-
ond, there would probably be a wide range of estimates of average
costs related to the scale of the SEA program.  The estimates of UI
agency costs in Oregon in 1996 and 1997 illustrate this point, i.e., $801
in 1997, compared with $384 in 1996.
It should also be noted that, from the 1996 and 1997 data reported
by the states, there is no way to undertake a benefit–cost analysis of
state SEA programs such as the one completed as part of the evaluation
of the UI Self-Employment Demonstration projects.
THE USE OF PROFILING IN SEA PROGRAMS 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
How Profiling Is Being Used in SEA Programs
Since profiling is used to select persons eligible for SEA, some de-
scription of the use of profiling in SEA programs is warranted.  Table
5.4 provides details of profiling in six states with SEA programs.16 The
table highlights four aspects of SEA profiling: 1) the screening criteria
used in the first stage of the profiling process to exclude UI claimants
from the second stage of profiling (the statistical model); 2) the vari-
ables used in the statistical model; 3) information on updating the sta-
tistical model; and 4) the profiling probability of exhaustion threshold
used to determine if persons are eligible to participate in SEA pro-
grams.
Profiling has two main operational functions in UI programs: to
provide rankings of claimants to local UI offices (used to select persons
to receive enhanced reemployment services), and to identify persons
eligible to participate in SEA.  The state criteria used to screen out peo-
ple in the first stage of the profiling process are identified in the top
rows of Table 5.4.  Claimants with definite dates of recall and those
hired through a union hiring hall are excluded from profiling in all
states.  These exclusions are based in authorizing statutory language.
Persons involved in labor–management disputes and persons with part-
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time employment are also often screened out during the first stage of
the profiling process, as they are job-attached.  Most states also exclude
persons with interstate claims.17 Table 5.4 shows these latter three ex-
clusions are not universally applied in the six states.  Less common are
exclusions based on potential duration of benefits and nonpayment of
benefits within 35 days of claim filing.  Each of the latter variables is
used in just one of the six states.
The profiling statistical model in SEA states typically includes
variables reflecting the person’s industry and occupation and educa-
tional attainment.  Of the six states, Oregon does not include industry
while Pennsylvania does not include occupation.
States also use a wide variety of variables in their statistical models
reflecting aspects of base period earnings and benefit entitlements.
Among the six states, only New York does not utilize at least one such
variable.  Note that two states utilize information on the length of the
delay in filing a claim for UI benefits to predict probability of exhaus-
tion.
Job tenure (the length of time the individual spent working in their
previous job) and reason for separation are utilized in three and two
states, respectively.  Besides these personal characteristics, the unem-
ployment situation in the local labor market enters four of the six
states’ profiling statistical models.  In short, the profiling models in
these six states rely on a variety of explanatory variables to predict the
probability of benefit exhaustion.
The labor market of the late 1990s has much lower unemployment
rates than the mid 1990s, when most profiling algorithms were first es-
timated.  Between 1993 and 1998, the nationwide exhaustion rate for
regular UI programs declined from 39 percent to 31 percent. Table 5.4
shows two aspects of change in the profiling models being used in
1999.  All states have updated time-dependent variables such as the lo-
cal unemployment indicator, industry employment growth, and vari-
ables related to benefit entitlements.  It would be interesting to know
how closely the time path of the average of the state profiling scores
(the predicted probabilities of exhaustion) matched the actual decreases
during the period.
However, the specifications of the underlying profiling models
have been unchanged in three states and changed only once in two
states.  In New Jersey the statistical model was reestimated in early
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1997, but the revised function was first used in January 1998.  Two
states had plans to reestimate their model in either 1999 or 2000.  The
changes in specification in Oregon have been more substantial, in part
because of changes in the state’s base period eligibility criteria.  Oregon
used to rely on weeks of employment but now uses earnings (with base
period hours worked used in a second eligibility calculation) in its
monetary determinations.  The relative infrequency of these changes is
somewhat surprising since the unemployment rates in the states have
changed so much since the mid 1990s.
The final aspect of Table 5.4 is the variation in the probability of
exhaustion threshold used by the states.  New York is at the high end of
the distribution, using a probability threshold of 70 percent.  In con-
trast, Pennsylvania uses no probability threshold for persons who pass
the initial set of screens in the first stage of the profiling process.  Ore-
gon has the next lowest threshold, at 33 percent.  It should also be not-
ed that the proportion of UI claimants who are identified through profil-
ing as likely exhaustees varies widely among states.  For example,
under its 70 percent probability threshold for SEA, New York identified
235,126 likely exhaustees in 1996, while Maine only identified 2,475
using its 40 percent threshold.  These numbers represented about 42
percent and 5 percent, respectively, of UI first payments in the two
states.
Operational Issues Arising from Profiling in SEA Programs and
State Responses: The New York State Experience
SEA programs were implemented in eight states between 1995 and
1998, beginning with a prototype SEA program in the state of New
York.  At the same time, all states were required to implement worker
profiling to identify UI customers who were likely to exhaust benefits
as part of the federal requirement to establish Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems.  The states that simultane-
ously implemented both WPRS and SEA had an interesting challenge
before them.  Not only did staff have to acclimate to a profiling model
with WPRS services, they also had the added challenge of having their
SEA programs tied into profiling.  This section provides a look at the
operational experiences of the first and largest of the state SEA pro-
grams—New York—including some comparisons with other SEA
states where comparable information is available.
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Under normal circumstances, when the profiling model is applied,
UI claimants are not cognizant of the mechanics behind profiling.  They
are told to report to the UI office for a WPRS orientation (called a “pro-
filing” orientation in New York).  Although state staff explain to pro-
filed claimants identified as likely exhaustees that they have been “se-
lected” because they have been determined as likely to exhaust
benefits, the assumption they often make is that the computer has ran-
domly selected participants for a WPRS orientation.  Very few
claimants question why they have been selected for reemployment ser-
vices, and they generally are quite appreciative of the information
gleaned from the profiling orientation.
Customarily, during profiling orientations in SEA states, several
options are given to the claimants who have been identified as likely
exhaustees via profiling and referred to services.  The first choice is
reemployment services.  These services can range from job search
workshops to resumé preparation assistance to career testing and coun-
seling.  The vast majority of profiled and referred UI customers choose
to take advantage of reemployment services.  Statistically, most of
these WPRS participants are interested in seeking a wage or salary po-
sition, but they have not been in the job market for a number of years
and just need assistance with their job search.
The second choice offered to UI claimants in a WPRS orientation
is retraining.  This option allows profiled and referred UI customers to
be excused from the full-time work search requirement in order to take
advantage of a full-time training course.  The training could be in a
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) class (e.g., in a community college),
a college course, or training in a private vocational school.  This is also
a popular option with profiled and referred claimants because in a num-
ber of states, getting into a training class extends unemployment bene-
fits for an additional one to six months.  It is important to note that even
individuals interested in starting a business may choose the training op-
tion as more colleges establish degrees and certificates in entrepre-
neurism.
The third available option (at least in the eight SEA states) is ex-
ploring the SEA program.  Generally, less than 3 percent of profiled
claimants identified as likely exhaustees are interested in going to an
SEA orientation session.  In many of the SEA states, supplemental let-
ters are sent to all UI customers identified as likely exhaustees to in-
form them about the SEA program.  Even with this, there is still a very
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small percentage of profiled customers taking advantage of SEA—less
than 1 percent of all UI claimants.  Thus, SEA is an option for a small
number of people with the motivation and skills necessary to start their
own business.
The primary problem with profiling and SEA does not occur with
an individual who has been profiled and identified as likely to exhaust
UI benefits, it occurs when an individual does not meet the probability
threshold for SEA eligibility but still wants to participate in SEA.  Not
all applicants are eligible to participate in the SEA program, and this
has proved to be a point of contention in some states, leading to dis-
putes of both nonmonetary determinations and appeals decisions deny-
ing SEA eligibility.  One source of operational problems has derived
from the use of a minimum probability of exhausting UI benefits as a
condition of eligibility for the SEA program.  Some claimants have not
understood (or do not agree) that likelihood of exhaustion is a neces-
sary element in determining eligibility.  There have also been more
general disputes over applicants’ profiling scores and whether these
scores reflect their true likelihood of being unemployed for 26 weeks or
more.  Generally, however, the volume of disputes has declined in more
recent periods.
In New York state, the probability threshold (or “cutoff”) for SEA
program eligibility is 70 percent (which has been lowered from 75 per-
cent when the program first started).  UI customers with a profiling
probability score below the 70th percentile are told in the local UI of-
fice that they have been found ineligible for the SEA program.  When
they inquire why they are ineligible, the topic of profiling inevitably
comes into discussion.  From the claimant’s perspective, suddenly a
statistical, computerized model stands between them and their ability to
be able to start their own business and still collect benefit payments.
Although the situation has improved since the beginning of the SEA
program, most local office staff still have difficulty understanding pro-
filing models, whether it is one using characteristics screens or a statis-
tical model (or, most typically, a two-stage process similar to the DOL
profiling model, which uses both screens and a statistical model).
In an attempt to explain why the profiling “score” is not high
enough to participate in SEA, the situation becomes even more compli-
cated and potentially confusing to the claimant.  This is due to the fact
that, to the lay person on the street, when they hear the word “score”
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they make the assumption that there has been a test given and they did
not pass.  States vary as to what statistical percentage they use as the
threshold (or cutoff) probability for SEA eligibility.  Inevitably though,
whenever there is an eligibility cutoff, there will be individuals on the
other side of the cutoff who do not qualify for the program and who are
frustrated and unhappy.
Note that officials in several SEA states have indicated that the pro-
filing cutoffs used in their SEA programs may be too high.  As the labor
market has strengthened in the late 1990s and state-level unemploy-
ment rates declined, the number of initial claims for UI benefits also de-
clined.  This decrease in the intake volume for the regular UI program
affected the numbers identified as SEA eligibles via profiling.  Two
states currently operate with lower threshold probabilities than contem-
plated when their SEA programs were being formulated: New York, at
70 percent rather than 75 percent, and Oregon, at 33 percent rather than
60 percent.  Two others, New Jersey and Maine, have considered re-
ducing their thresholds.  Finally, as noted earlier in this chapter, Penn-
sylvania has no probability threshold for SEA eligibility; all of those
claimants who pass the screens in the first stage of Pennsylvania’s pro-
filing process are informed about the SEA program.18 Further reduc-
tions in the cutoff percentages can be anticipated if labor markets be-
come as robust as they were in the late 1990s.
Administratively, UI claimants with a low statistical probability of
exhaustion present a real challenge to the SEA states.  The easy way out
would be to lower the profiling threshold to a point where nearly any-
one could participate in the SEA program.  This approach, however,
presents the following problems.  First, to lower the score to such a
point compromises the integrity of the profiling system in terms of its
ability to identify claimants who are likely to exhaust UI benefits.  Not
all UI claimants are likely to exhaust their benefits.  As a matter of fact,
New York has estimated that, in times of full employment, only 15 to
30 percent of all claimants will be highly likely to exhaust benefits.  In
the late 1990s in New York State, because the UI recipiency rate was so
low (averaging approximately 5 percent), the proportion of claimants
who were likely to exhaust benefits dropped even lower to only 11 per-
cent of the total UI claimant population in the state.19
A second issue regarding reducing the profiling threshold arises in
those states where employers’ benefit rating is charged back to a specif-
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ic firm, thus affecting the employer’s experience-rated UI tax liability.
In this situation, the use of profiling helps to ensure that only those who
will truly have a difficult time becoming reemployed will be eligible
for the SEA program and thus receive self-employment allowance pay-
ments.  This helps in assuring employers that they will not be paying
for benefits that claimants would not otherwise have received, and that
there will be fewer instances of direct competition against the former
employer; in fact, for workers laid off through a mass layoff or plant
closing, quite often there is no existing former employer.20
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Conclusions Regarding Targeting in the SEA Program
As we have seen, the use of profiling in state SEA programs has
had both positive and negative effects on these programs.  On the posi-
tive side, the use of statistical profiling models in the SEA program has
targeted the program on a subgroup of UI claimants who have the char-
acteristics typically associated with dislocated workers.  Moreover, in
those states where outcomes data are available, those dislocated UI
claimants (selected through the profiling process) who participated in
the SEA program have generally shown positive outcomes, in terms of
both high rates of business start-ups (65 percent or higher) and also
entry into wage and salary employment (with employment rates of be-
tween 18 and 50 percent).  It was difficult, however, to estimate self-
employment earnings, and wage and salary earnings of SEA partici-
pants were generally lower (0.51 to 0.69 percent) than statewide
average wages.
The ability of the profiling models to meet their objective of target-
ing the SEA program solely on individuals who are permanently sepa-
rated from their previous job is less ambiguous.  As Table 5.4 clearly
shows, all states have included a variable in their worker profiling
process that screens out those UI recipients who are on recall status, al-
though a WPRS evaluation report to Congress shows that states varied
in how they defined “recall status” (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker
1997, p. II-2).  Of course, these recall status screens will not be 100 per-
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cent accurate.  For example, over 45 percent of the states screened out
not only those individuals who did not have a definite date of recall to
their former employer, but also claimants who indicated that they ex-
pected to be recalled but did not have a definite date (Dickinson,
Kreutzer, and Decker 1997, p. II-2).  Moreover, it is clear from the re-
sults of state follow-up surveys of SEA participants described earlier
that many of the business start-ups involved large changes in the types
of work activities being undertaken by SEA participants compared with
their previous wage and salary jobs.  Thus, it appears that the pres-
ence of these permanent layoff/recall status screens have served to min-
imize any potential the SEA program might have for disrupting an
employer/employee relationship.  Also, because SEA program partici-
pants are likely to draw no more in SEA allowances than they would
have drawn anyway in regular UI benefits, it appears unlikely that SEA
will have a significant impact on employers’ experience-rated UI tax
liability.
The requirement that profiling be used in SEA programs, however,
has not been without its downsides.  There are at least two major prob-
lems that states have experienced in using some type of profiling
method in their SEA programs.  First, profiling has restricted the access
of some UI claimants to the SEA program who might otherwise be
good candidates for self-employment.  This is not surprising, since in-
dividuals identified by profiling as likely to exhaust their UI benefits
are likely to be individuals who have more barriers to reemployment
than UI claimants in general.  Thus, although there are obviously ex-
ceptions, profiling will identify a group of the unemployed who, on av-
erage, are less likely to have the knowledge and skills necessary for
self-employment.
For this reason, state economic development agencies and mi-
croenterprise practitioners interested primarily in promoting microen-
terprise and small business development have often viewed profiling
as the wrong approach to targeting individuals who would be success-
ful in business.  However, their concern about the conflict between tar-
geting SEA on likely UI exhaustees and service providers’ desire to fo-
cus on those most likely to succeed in business has failed to
materialize because of the self-selection factor in SEA.  That is, even
if a particular claimant is judged to be likely to exhaust UI benefits,
they must still be interested in pursuing self-employment, and if so, be
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motivated enough complete the sequence of self-screening activities
(e.g., the orientation and “reality check” about the pros and cons of
self-employment).
The characteristics of SEA participants presented above clearly
show that SEA participants are not a random group drawn from the
pool of eligibles identified as likely exhaustees through state profiling
models.  Rather, SEA program participants are a self-selected subgroup
of dislocated UI claimants.  SEA participation rates are higher for
whites, individuals with higher educational attainment, and those from
the professional, technical, and managerial occupations.  This evi-
dence, in combination with the very small proportions of likely UI ex-
haustees (i.e., as eligible for SEA) who actually apply for SEA, demon-
strates that this strong self-selection process is at work in current state
SEA programs, just as in both of the UI Self-Employment Demonstra-
tion projects.  The end result of this process is that, while the use of pro-
filing in SEA targets the program on dislocated UI claimants, the self-
selection process used for SEA appears to be further targeting SEA
participation on a subset of dislocated claimants who have the knowl-
edge and skills necessary for self-employment.
For program operators, the restriction on access to the SEA pro-
gram resulting from the use of profiling has also created a second prob-
lem—dealing with those individuals who are interested in self-employ-
ment but are not eligible for the SEA program due to their (relatively
low) profiling scores.  By restricting the access of individuals with (rel-
atively) low profiling scores to the SEA program, profiling can generate
administrative headaches for SEA program operators as they attempt to
explain to these individuals why they are ineligible for the SEA pro-
gram, what the profiling model is and does, and how profiling relates to
self-employment in the first place (which, as noted earlier, is far from
an obvious relationship).  The experience of the first and largest SEA
program, the New York program, provides an illustration of how the
use of profiling as a targeting mechanism for SEA can result in unhap-
py and frustrated claimants, as well as additional work for the few SEA
program staff.  It is certainly possible that the reductions in the proba-
bility of exhaustion thresholds for SEA eligibility that occurred in state
SEA programs in the late 1990s was due in part to a desire to minimize
the administrative burden on state staff by reducing the proportion of
claimants interested in SEA who do not qualify for the program.  On
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the other hand, it is just as likely that this occurrence was simply a tem-
porary response by states to attempt to maintain SEA program enroll-
ments in a time of declining UI caseloads.
Future Directions
Some future directions that the permanently reauthorized SEA pro-
gram may take are as follows:
• The use of profiling will remain an important feature of SEA
programs as a dislocated worker program.  The use of profiling
is essential for targeting SEA on a subpopulation of UI claimants
who are dislocated workers, and it remains a requirement for
SEA programs under federal law.  The continuing concern about
employer attachment issues means that this situation is not like-
ly to change anytime soon.  However, the specific variables used
in profiling models for SEA are likely to change over time and
eventually may be more customized to SEA needs.
• There will be interest in looking at which SEA participants suc-
ceed in their business ventures over the long term.  Even with
the very small numbers of SEA participants, the program has al-
ready provided a pool of well over 6,000 individuals who can be
studied to see if there are common characteristics of “typical”
entrepreneurs that can be developed.  New York plans to look at
this issue over the next several years to see if any conclusions
can be drawn on the elements of the “typical” entrepreneur for
future use in developing customized profiling models for the
SEA program that take into account these “entrepreneurial”
characteristics, in addition to those factors associated with the
likelihood of benefit exhaustion.
• Now that SEA has become a permanent program, DOL’s direct
oversight role in the SEA program will likely diminish.
Changes to the SEA program in a UI Program Letter (UIPL
11-99) that eliminated the requirement for states to submit a
state SEA plan to DOL for review and approval prior to imple-
menting a SEA program mean that it is easier than ever for states
to establish programs.  The fact that a state’s SEA legislation
conforms to the basic tenets of federal SEA legislation, includ-
ing the requirement that profiling be used in selecting SEA pro-
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gram participants, will now be sufficient for DOL approval of a
state’s approach to implementing SEA.
• The SEA program will gradually expand to additional states.  In
fact, three additional states, Arkansas, Washington State, and
Massachusetts, have been working on enacting the conforming
state legislation necessary to establish their own SEA programs.
• There may be a need for a self-employment program that serves
a broader population of the unemployed, so that individuals who
are not dislocated workers would be eligible to participate.  Such
a program could not use WIA dislocated worker funding for
business development services (e.g., microenterprise training),
but states would have the option to fund such services for a
broad range of jobseekers.  Such a program, however, would
have the potential problem of employer opposition if nondislo-
cated UI claimants are permitted to participate.
• The availability of technical assistance to additional states inter-
ested in implementing SEA programs will be critical in creating
effective programs.  With diminishing direct involvement of
DOL staff in the planning process, a “how-to” manual for states
to assist them in developing and operating these programs be-
comes a particularly critical need.
• If SEA programs are to be successful in the long-run, states will
have to strengthen the interprogram linkages between UI pro-
grams and self-employment service providers.  In particular,
state SEA programs will need to establish strong working rela-
tionships with both microenterprise training providers under the
Workforce Investment Act and with the Small Business Admin-
istration’s network of small business development centers,
which can provide SEA program participants with extensive
business counseling and technical assistance services.
Notes
This paper represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the poli-
cies or positions of the U.S. Department of Labor, the New York State Department of
Labor, or the Urban Institute.  Jacob Benus and Wayne Gordon provided substantive
comments which helped improve on a prior version of this paper.
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1. Based on data from the series of BLS Displaced Worker Supplements to the Cur-
rent Population Survey (Wandner 1997, p. 96).  Also see U.S. Department of La-
bor (1998).
2. Based on data from the biannual displaced worker surveys conducted by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “blue-collar workers,” in particular those workers
in manufacturing industries, accounted for half of all displaced workers in the
early 1980s.  However, the most recent BLS displaced worker survey (February
1998) indicates that slightly more displaced workers were from managerial, pro-
fessional specialty, and technical occupations (30 percent) compared with those
“blue-collar” occupations more typically associated with worker displacement
(defined here as precision production, craft, and repair workers plus operators,
fabricators, and laborers).
3. For an in-depth review of these preliminary results and their impact on federal
SEA program legislation, see Messenger and Wandner (1994).
4. Like many states, Pennsylvania uses screens in the first stage of their profiling
process to exclude claimants who do not meet certain criteria; e.g., claimants with
definite dates of recall.  However, all claimants who reach the second stage of the
profiling process (the statistical model) are informed about SEA in the eight
SDAs with active SEA programs.
5. Maryland has one statewide vendor who hosts the initial meeting.  However, cor-
respondence from the UI agency precedes this meeting.  Claimant letters are for-
warded to the service vendor, who then extends invitations to attend an informa-
tion meeting.  Pennsylvania’s SDAs follow different procedures including
holding the initial meeting at the vendor’s site.
6. For example, the 1996 annual reports indicated that very few loans were received
in Oregon, Maine, and Delaware.  In that year, loans were relatively common
only in New York, but many of them came from personal sources, not from finan-
cial institutions. 
7. Note that SEA participants are counts of individuals, whereas insured unemploy-
ment refers to weekly averages measured in thousands.
8. In 1996, household data from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) indi-
cated that the average age of those working as self-employed in nonagricultural
industries was 44.4 years, compared with 38.4 years for wage and salary workers.
9. Typically the base period is the first four of the five most recent fully completed
calendar quarters preceding the UI claim. 
10. The presence of WBA maximums places an upper limit on weekly benefits for
many high wage workers. There is no similar upper limit on weekly and quarter-
ly earnings.  Thus, the earnings differentials would be larger than the differentials
in WBAs that have a constrained maximum.
11. New Jersey and Maine present partial exceptions to this statement.
12. In New York, 1996 fourth-quarter wage and salary data are based on state income
tax records.
13. In 1997, only three people participated in Oregon’s SEA program.  This explains
the low figures.
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14. There is a question of whether new businesses started by SEA participants dis-
place existing businesses.  Although the potential displacement effect is likely to
be quite small given the small number of SEA participants, it is impossible to es-
timate this effect with existing data.
15. The variable cost estimates shown in Benus et al. (1995, Table 10.2) have been in-
flated by a ratio of 1.1938, which represents the ratio of the 1997 all items con-
sumer price index (CPI) to the 1990 level of the CPI.
16. While California and Delaware have enacted all the necessary legislation to oper-
ate SEA, the programs in both states were inactive in 1998.  During 1997, these
states reported 19 and 40 weeks compensated by their respective SEA programs.
Both reported zero weeks compensated in 1998 (ETA report 5159).  It should be
noted that the Delaware SEA program actively enrolled participants in previous
years, but SEA has never been actively pursued in California.  States also cur-
tailed their SEA operations due to the scheduled expiration of SEA in December
1998.
17. A profiling process for interstate claimants has not yet been established.
18. It should be noted that among states with an SEA program, only Pennsylvania
does not use a probability threshold determining program eligibility.  Many states
do not establish explicit probability thresholds as part of their profiling proce-
dures for WPRS.  Typically, claimants who pass the initial screens in the first
stage of the profiling process are ranked in order of their probability of benefit ex-
haustion, from those with the highest exhaustion probabilities to those with the
lowest probabilities.  Then, individuals are referred to services beginning with
those at the top of the ranking (with highest exhaustion probabilities) and pro-
ceeding down the list until the supply of available reemployment services is ex-
hausted.
19. Data provided by the New York State Department of Labor, Unemployment In-
surance program office.
20. See the discussion on profiling and employer attachment in the second section of
this chapter for an analysis of this issue.
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Comments on Chapter 5
Jacob M. Benus
IMPAQ International
The chapter by Jon Messenger, Carolyn Peterson-Vaccaro, and
Wayne Vroman effectively describes the likely benefits and the poten-
tial problems generated by the implementation of profiling in self-em-
ployment assistance (SEA) programs.  The chapter also speculates
about the impact of profiling on SEA programs.  I believe that the im-
pact of profiling on SEA programs can and should be analyzed more
rigorously.  In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) may already
have the data to measure this impact.  Before describing how DOL
might evaluate the impact of profiling on SEA programs, I will first
briefly review the contents of the chapter.
The first section of the chapter describes the UI Self-Employment
Demonstrations project.1 These demonstrations were part of an exper-
imental design project to evaluate the impact of SEA programs on the
unemployed.  The project was funded by DOL and implemented in the
states of Washington and Massachusetts.
To reduce the potential for “excess costs,” the Massachusetts
demonstration incorporated a UI exhaustion algorithm.  Only those
above a cutoff probability (i.e., 0.25) were invited to participate in the
program (this cutoff eliminated 12 percent of the UI claimants).  This
exhaustion algorithm was included in the demonstration largely in re-
sponse to legislative requirements and states’ concerns about excess
costs.  Another feature of the Massachusetts demonstration was the
withdrawal of the work search waiver after 24 weeks.  That is, after 24
weeks, participants had to drop out of the SEA program and search for
regular wage and salary employment in order to remain eligible for the
remaining 6 weeks of UI benefits (approximately $1,500).
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Between these two features of the demonstration (i.e., profiling and
the 24-week benefit cutoff), I believe that the 24-week benefit cutoff
was much more important in promoting budget neutrality.  If this asser-
tion is correct, the chapter’s statements about the effectiveness of pro-
filing on budget neutrality may not be warranted.  The problem is that
without a rigorous evaluation, we cannot be certain about the impact of
profiling.
The chapter next goes into an assessment of the implementation of
SEA in eight states.  Essentially, the findings in this section confirm the
results of the Self-Employment Demonstrations.  That is, highly edu-
cated individuals from professional, technical, and managerial occupa-
tions with high prior earnings make up the bulk of SEA participants.
Following this discussion, the chapter describes the use of profiling in
the state programs, the implementation of profiling, and the operational
issues that profiling raises.
One of the more interesting operational issues described in the
chapter is reprofiling.  That is, UI claimants who are determined to be
ineligible for SEA as a result of a low profiling score may request that
their score be recalculated in an effort to become eligible.  In New
York, the only state to permit reprofiling, one-third of the 1,800 partici-
pants in 1997 came into the program after having been reprofiled.
The chapter concludes with the authors pointing out the positives
and negatives of profiling for SEA programs.  One of the positives
claimed for profiling is that profiling results in, or at least enhances,
budget neutrality.  This conclusion is partly based on evidence from the
Massachusetts demonstration.  This evidence, however, is weak and, in
my opinion, not convincing.
I believe we can get more definitive evidence on this issue from
data available in the UI Self-Employment Demonstrations.  To analyze
the impact of profiling, we can apply a profiling model to the Washing-
ton State sample (where profiling was not used).  That is, we can pro-
file the treatment and control group members in the Washington sam-
ple and eliminate those who fall below the threshold.  Using this ap-
proach, we can estimate excess costs with and without the eliminated
group.  This exercise can quantify the impact of profiling.  If profiling
has no impact on budget neutrality, we should reconsider the assertion
that profiling is essential to promote budget neutrality in SEA pro-
grams.
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The above analysis can be enhanced by altering the threshold level.
For example, we can alter the threshold level from 0.25 to 0.50.  If pro-
filing reduces excess costs, one might expect excess costs to be lower
under the 0.50 threshold than under the 0.25 threshold.  This is clearly
a testable hypothesis, and the data for testing the hypothesis are avail-
able from the UI Self-Employment Demonstrations.
My main conclusion is that the argument in favor of profiling in
SEA programs rests heavily on the presumed impact of profiling on
budget neutrality.  Let’s measure whether this presumption is correct.
DOL has the data to do it!  It would be a shame to leave such an impor-
tant issue unanswered.
Note
1. For a description of this project, see Benus et al. (1995).  
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Comments on Chapter 5
Wayne Gordon
U.S. Department of Labor
It should first be understood that the self-employment assistance
(SEA) program is small, as measured by the number of states having
implemented programs in the six years since authorization.  Eleven
states took the first step of implementation by changing legislation, but
only eight can claim any significant effort.  Of the eight, three started
relatively late in the initial five-year authorization.
Achieving widespread state commitment to the program was made
difficult because of uncertainty about the continuation of the program
after December of 1998.  Now that the authorization is permanent, the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) expects several more states to imple-
ment SEA programs soon, and DOL is encouraging more states to con-
sider doing so. This is vital to long-term survival of the program.
An important question that the chapter fails to address is: With pro-
filing thresholds so low in many of the SEA states, what role does pro-
filing play?  It appears that the first step of the profiling process, which
applies screens to exclude those with union hiring hall and employer at-
tachment, as well as self-selection, are the more powerful determinants
of who enrolls in SEA programs.  For example, many people express an
interest in SEA-type programs.  DOL handles many letters and phone
inquiries about how to get into the SEA program.  Second, the profiling
models exclude some demographic characteristics that are key predic-
tors of successful entrepreneurial success.  Third, not all entrepreneur-
ial activity in SEA is in direct competition with past employers.  Final-
ly, if it can be shown that the self-employed hire new workers, then
widening the SEA offer to more initial claimants would not threaten
trust-fund solvency if these employers are paying UI taxes on behalf of
new employees.
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Under the Workforce Investment Act, new administrative relation-
ships are being forged between the public employment service and oth-
er agencies like small business development centers and the Service
Corps of Retired Executives.  It would be interesting to hear more in
the chapter about what states are doing to make these specialized ser-
vices available to SEA participants, and how continuous improvement
principles can be achieved.  In relation to such supplementary services,
it would be useful to 1) identify which entrepreneurial services would
be useful in promoting success of SEA recipients, 2) determine the
costs of these services which are often provided “in kind,” and 3) es-
tablish a feedback loop between these new service providers and the UI
system to ensure that SEA claimants are satisfying eligibility require-
ments.
State and federal reporting of SEA activity needs to be revisited to
determine the best type of information for policymakers and the gener-
al public.  Currently, since only a small number of states have pro-
grams, the annual report method described in the chapter is adequate.
However, if many more states were to operate SEA programs, this type
of reporting would be excessively burdensome.  Furthermore, not all
successful outcomes for SEA participants can be captured under cur-
rent WIA performance measures.  Separate measures will need to be in-
corporated under WIA to properly capture performance outcomes that
are unique to SEA.  A specialized program such as SEA, which targets
a small slice of the UI claimant population, requires regular evaluation
to ensure effectiveness and use of best practices.  Performance moni-
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